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ABSTRACT 
  
Understanding the nature of white collar crime is a central issue in public policy.  
Testing the theories presented by Benson, Madensen and Eck (2009), I examine the role 
of informal religious networks in the criminal activity of Bernard Madoff, perpetrator of 
one of the largest white collar crimes in United States history.  In contrast to previous 
studies that suggest that religion may reduce the incidence of criminal behavior, I show 
that the opposite can also be true.  Most white collar crimes, like those perpetrated by 
Madoff, are exploitations of trust, which can be fostered by a shared religious identity 
between the victim and perpetrator.  Using data from the National Center of Charitable 
Statistics, I construct two measures of Jewish religious network strength at the county 
level: the concentration of Jewish non-profit organizations and the revenue of Jewish 
non-profit organizations.  Additionally, using data from the Jewish Community Center 
Association of North America and several U.S. Kosher certification organizations, I 
construct the number of Jewish community centers and the number of kosher restaurants 
per county.  I show that conditional on the number of high income individuals in a 
county, residents of counties in which there were stronger Jewish networks were more 
likely to have been victimized by Madoff.  In addition, I show that residents of areas 
where Madoff lived or worked were more likely to be victims, but that Jewish network 
strength appears to counteract this “distance effect.”  Non-profit organizations, which 
were also victims of Madoff, were less affected by the strength of this informal network.5 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Social networks have long been considered important sources of jobs, information 
and assistance.  Social networks form through individuals linked by a common bond, 
social status, geographic or cultural connection.  Social networking websites like 
Facebook, MySpace, and LinkedIn have exploded in recent years, with companies even 
using these websites to research and recruit potential employees.  Additionally, 
celebrities often suggest that to achieve fame, individuals must explore social groups and 
settings in order to build the necessary relationships.  Many books even suggest that if 
you want to get anywhere in life, you need to connect with people. 
Substantial research has shown that there are real benefits of social networks.  
Membership in social networks may provide substantial physical and mental health 
benefits (Maulik, Eaton & Bradshaw, 2009; Smith & Nicholas, 2008).  Trusting 
relationships and tight knit bonds often form from members’ shared common interests or 
characteristics (Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, & Szeidl, 2009).  It is likely that these 
relationships may foster non-pecuniary benefits, such as increased friendship and 
companionship.  However, this same sense of trust may lead network members to take 
greater within-network financial and business risks (Light & Rosenstein, 1995).  In 
sociological theory, these risks have been termed “generalized exchanges,” or 
transactions between two individuals in which one participant provides a good to the 
other without any immediate return, purely based on the trust they place in the other party 
(Bearman, 1997).  One typical example is a susu, in which ethnic West Indians, Africans, 
Mexicans and Asians pool an amount of money with others from their ethnic-social 
network and rotate the recipient of a fixed amount on a monthly basis (Halter, 1995).  6 
 
The existence of susus could imply that members trust each other as much or more than 
they trust federally regulated and insured banks where they could easily deposit their 
money.  
 However, the potential for these networks to be abused is often not considered.  
Social networks can also be used to promote illegal markets, such as drug (Reuter & 
Calkuins, 2004) and under-the-table employment markets (Venkatesh, 2006), which 
would ordinarily fail due to the prohibitively high costs and risks associated with their 
existence.  Social networks have also been used to collude in the heavy electrical 
equipment industry (Baker & Faulkner, 1993) and to shelter fraud in companies with both 
legal and illegal operations (Baker & Faulkner, 2003).  These markets thrive based on 
members’ beliefs that fellow members would not hurt “their own.”  Excessive trust can 
leave members of these social networks open to theft, fraud and deceit.   
  White-collar crime is commonly described as an abuse of trust (Schover, 1998).  
Unlike victims of street crime, many victims of white-collar crime do not know that they 
are victims until after the crime has occurred, if even then.  As Levi (2009) highlights, 
white collar crime is typically committed by known individuals, whereas the public 
typically thinks of criminals as strangers.  Thus, individuals may be at a particularly high 
risk for white collar crime victimization as they are not as skeptical of the offender.  The 
elimination of the “necessary link of geographic propinquity between victim and 
offender” means that the criminal could be across the country or in one’s own 
neighborhood (Levi, 2009).  Though white-collar crime is commonly associated with the 
banking industry, white-collar crime has pervaded a variety of industries, including auto 
repair (Schneider, 2009), real estate (Levitt & Syverson, 2008), newspaper sales 7 
 
(Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2008), food sales (Levitt, 2006) and sumo wrestling (Duggan & 
Levitt, 2002).  The costs of these crimes often cannot be calculated because of the 
“invisible” nature of white-collar crime and the difficulty in compiling data on discovered 
offenses.  However, in the wake of Tyco, Enron and now the Madoff scandal, the public 
outcry suggests that people are heavily affected by these offenses.  
White collar crime poses a particular issue for government policy because a 
deterrent white-collar crime cannot be effectively developed without being able to 
measure the causes and effects of white-collar crime.  Survey data has consistently shown 
for over two decades that the public views white collar crime almost as serious an offense 
as traditional street crime (Evans et al. 1993; Levi, 1987).  The social harm caused by 
white-collar crime may be far more damaging than the social harm caused by street 
crime.  White collar crime can erode the public’s trust in institutions and increases 
transaction costs as people become increasingly suspicious of others and require 
excessive amounts of information for economic transactions (Levi, 2009; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993).  In fact, as Levi (2009) highlights, the increases in transaction costs can 
be so large that they merit heavy consideration in the cost-benefit analysis of crime 
control policies.  Moreover, unlike street crime, where victims typically know ways to 
protect themselves either privately (e.g. installing a home security system) or publicly 
(e.g. voting for officials who want to increase police presence), little is known about 
methods of protection from white-collar crime. 
To contribute to this newly emergent field, I attempt to disentangle the effect of 
religious network strength on white-collar crime victimization.  Unlike other research 
which exploits variation in the regulatory environment to identify the incidence of 8 
 
victimization (Duggan and Levitt, 2002; DellaVigna & Ferrara, 2007) or creates 
experimental situations that artificially manipulate victimization (Pruckner & Sausgruber, 
2008; Schneider, 2009), my research uses the universe of known victims in the Bernard 
Madoff Ponzi Scheme.  This difference in datasets and measurement allows me to 
measure the average white-collar crime (opposed to the marginal crime).  As I will later 
discuss, this difference will allow for more precise victimization measurement and 
resultant crime policy.  This study will explore the allegation that Bernard Madoff used 
his membership in the Jewish American enclave to defraud investors and will examine 
the extent to which social networks facilitate white-collar crime and. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  I begin with a short description of the Madoff 
scandal in section II.  I then describe the history of social networking theory, why Jewish-
Americans can be considered a social network, the role that informal networks can play 
in investment behavior, and how individuals in those networks can be at increased risk of 
white collar crime victimization.  In section IV, I describe the data that I use to measure 
white collar crime and informal religious network strength, and in section V present my 
analytic strategy for identifying the relationship between these variables.  Next, I discuss 
my empirical results in section VI and finally conclude in section VII.   
  9 
 
II.  THE MADOFF SCANDAL 
Bernard Madoff founded Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (hereafter 
Madoff LLC) in 1960.  Although initially investors’ returns were ordinary relative to the 
market, between the mid 1980s and early 1990s, returns began to sky rocket.  Madoff 
became known for double-digit returns on investments (typically around 12-15%).  His 
guarantee of high returns attracted high-wealth individuals and organizations alike from 
across the country including major non-profits, unions and multimillionaires.  However, 
unbeknownst to investors, these high returns were actually assets of subsequent investors.  
The investors were victims of the largest Ponzi Scheme in US history. 
Even without the benefit of hindsight, choosing to invest in Madoff was a high-
risk choice.  Madoff was exempt from certain SEC regulation.  News reports and the SEC 
itself have suggested that Madoff played a prominent role in creating an exemption, 
which permitted him to temporarily sell stock that he did not own as long as the purpose 
was to “maintain liquidity” (Wutkowski, 2008).  Additionally, Madoff used many “feeder 
funds,” which allowed him to officially report far fewer individual investors than existed 
(Chew, 2009).  Therefore, Madoff faced far less daily scrutiny than did the average 
investment firm (Krug, 2008).   
Additionally, the SEC’s Inspector General found that between 1992 and 2008, the 
SEC ignored six substantive complaints against Madoff (Stout, 2009).  For example, in 
May 2000 Harry Markopolos, a Massachusetts-based financial analyst, sent a letter to the 
SEC urging an investigation of Madoff LLC, which he believed was a Ponzi scheme.
1  
                                                 
1 The media suggests Madoff may have been able to escape SEC investigation in spite of Markopolos’ 
allegations because Madoff had built a tight, trusted social network with SEC employees (Zuckerman & 
Scannell, 2008). It should be noted that a recent report issued by the SEC Inspector General found no 10 
 
Nonetheless, the SEC failed to take any action.  Despite such evasion, on December 11, 
2008, Madoff confessed that he had been running a Ponzi scheme.  In subsequent 
months, Madoff plead guilty to 11 counts of filing false reports with the SEC; theft; and 
securities, wire, and mail fraud.  Ultimately, Madoff paid an undisclosed fine to the SEC, 
was banned from working in the financial sector and received a 150-year term prison 
sentence. 
 Besides taking money from many of the socially elite, it has been widely 
suggested that Madoff preyed in particular on fellow members of his Jewish-American 
social network (Fox News, 2009).  Reports often cite his wife’s Kosher cookbook 
(Cowan, 2009), his purported strict adherence to Jewish practices (Cowan, 2009), and his 
involvement in Jewish organizations like Yeshiva University (Chiber, 2009) as examples 
of how Madoff built trust within the Jewish-American network.
2    As a result of the 
Madoff scheme, some researchers have even called for charitable foundations to alter the 
size and structure of their operations in order to decrease their reliance on “personal ties” 
(Jagpal & Craig, 2009).   
  
                                                                                                                                                 
substantial relationship between Madoff and SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, who formerly headed the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (Associated Press, 2009). 
2 Although unverified, rumors have spread that Madoff had an affinity for pork sausage, which suggests he 
may have not been as religious as he suggested, since this would clearly violate the same laws of Kashrut 
that he and his wife swore they upheld. 11 
 
III.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A.  The History of Social Networks Research 
  Social networks are associations of people drawn together by family, work, 
hobbies, ethnicity or other defining characteristics.  Early social network research is 
traced to Compte’s examination of static (social interconnections) relationships in the 
mid-nineteenth century (Freeman, 2004).  Durkheim also pioneered the field with his 
1897 cornerstone work, Suicide: A Study in Sociology,  In his theory of norms of social 
control, Durkheim asserted that religious groups exert an informal control over their 
constituents.  This sense of control and belonging to a community, Durkheim argued led 
to regulation in excessive aspects of one’s life.  Without such control, individuals would 
feel anomie (i.e., alienation and a lack of purpose).  This theory suggests that religious 
social networks may have positive social effects by reducing excessive behavior, which 
would in turn promote rational actions. 
Building on Durkheim’s fundamentals, later social theorists continued to extend 
social network theory research.  Tönnies (1935) characterized social groups using his 
theories of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.  Gemeinschaft, as defined by Tönnies, 
explains bonding between friends and families; he argues that these relationships are 
based upon emotional bonding and unity.  On the other hand, Gesellschaft promoted the 
continuation of impersonal social relationships based on individuals needs to fulfill 
certain fundamental monetary needs (Tönnies, 1935).  Barnes’ (1954) seminal piece on 
social relationships in a small Norwegian village explicitly defined social networks for 
the first time as “an association of people drawn together by family, work or hobby.”  
This term was later expanded by a series of researchers to include all social categories 12 
 
(e.g. race, gender, ethnicity) and fixed-relationship categories (e.g. family and tribes) 
(Berkowitz, 1982). 
  Although there are many metrics for social network strength, one defining feature 
of social networks is the strength of the tie.  Two common distinctions are strong ties and 
weak ties.  Strong ties, as defined by Sir Hebert Spencer and Chalres Horten Cooley in 
the early twentieth century are connections mainly characterized by primary relationships 
(Freeman, 2004; Granovetter, 1973).  Primary relationships are often warmer, closer 
relationships such as friends, family and lovers (Gordon, 1964).  These strong ties may 
lead to more trusting bonds (Coleman, 1988).  Weak ties, in contrast, are associated with, 
among other things, secondary relationships, lower frequencies of contact, lower duration 
of the tie, less emotional closeness (Granovetter, 1973).  Gordon (1964) identifies these 
bonds as looser links, often constructed through employment, civic engagement (e.g. 
social clubs) and political activism.  Granovetter (1973) suggested that weak ties allowed 
individuals who barely knew each other to associate through sharing a common belief or 
characteristic.  Moreover, he suggested that strong ties could not develop without 
preexisting weak ties.   
Centrality, the measurement of individuals’ position in a social network, is also 
important in measuring social networks.  Centrality can be measured in terms of the 
number of connections an individual has (degree centrality), the number of individuals 
between two unconnected individuals (betweeness centrality), and the social distance 
between individuals in a network (closeness centrality) (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
Research has associated increased centrality with increased power and influence in a 
social network (Brass, 1984; Friedkin, 1993).  Additionally, Burt (1992) argues that being 13 
 
at the center of many disconnected people is critical to holding group power.  By being in 
contact with many otherwise disorganized people, this coordinating person can more 
easily manipulate the group and prevent others within the group from colluding against 
you.  Such power may even provide the coordinating individual the exclusive power to 
direct the flow of resources between individuals (Burt, 1992). 
B.  The Formation of the American Jewish Social Network 
  The existence of Judaism as an ethnicity demonstrates the existence of a Jewish 
American social network.  Ethnicity is a socially defined concept based on cultural 
characteristics:  language, religion, history, appearance, ancestry and/or region (Nagel, 
1994).  Under this definition, Jewish Americans are an ethnic group: they share a 
common religion, religious language and history composed of stories of events, a 
homeland and oppression.  Moreover, many Jewish Americans’ share a common heritage 
as many of their ancestors immigrated from Central and Eastern Europe (Diner, 2004).  
Additionally, there are many population clusters of Jewish Americans in particular cities 
throughout the United States, such as New York City, Miami and Los Angeles (American 
Jewish Committee, 2007).  As defined by Berkowitz (1982), the existence of such a clear 
ethnic community would prove the existence of a Jewish American social network. 
 Historical  and  continued  persecution of American Jews has strengthened the 
Jewish American culture.  Discrimination against Jews is widely traced back to the 
seventeenth century.  During the early 1900s, following a sizeable increase in the Jewish-
American community, large groups of Jewish American immigrants were victims of 
discrimination (Tobin & Sassler, 1988).  Starting in the late nineteenth century, cities 
began to implement restrictive zoning, which overtly banned Jews from living in certain 14 
 
neighborhoods.  While the Supreme Court banned these zoning restrictions, developers 
quickly turned to restrictive deed covenants in order to circumvent the federal ban.  The 
Supreme Court’s support of these covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley (1926) has been 
considered a serious promoter of widespread segregation in suburbia (Jones-Correa, 
2000/2001).  For example, in Baltimore, developers advertised developments that 
“safeguard owners from…uses of property detrimental to the value and general good of a 
residential section” (Power, 1996).  While the 1926 ruling was overturned in 1948, a 
considerable amount of segregation already existed (Jones-Correa, 2000/2001).   
To overcome this discrimination, Jews bound together as a “middleman 
minority.”  Middlemen minorities, such as American Jews, are minority groups that take 
an intermediate status position between consumers and producers, typically in trade and 
commerce markets.  For example, many Jews in New York City at the turn of the 
twentieth century lived and worked together in trade in order to save money (Sowell, 
2005) and Palestinian-Arabs are often found to be middlemen in the grocery store 
business in cities where they reside (Cohen & Tyree, 1994).  Bonacich (1973) argues that 
the continued hostility from the host society (i.e., Christian America) alienates American 
Jews, and in turn, reinforces a sentiment of Jewish American organization and structure.  
This increased Jewish American structure feeds increased host hostility.  Ultimately, this 
cycle promotes and continues Jewish American enclaves and social networks (Bonacich, 
1973).  This theory is also consistent with Burt’s (1992) argument that the being the 
connector in a group holds the most power.  In the case of middlemen minorities, such as 
Jewish Americans, they were able to connect consumers and producers while maintaining 
significant market power.  15 
 
Although most Jewish Americans currently easily coexist with other Americans in 
residential, marital and occupation settings, anti-Semitism remains a source of concern in 
the United States.  A 2007 survey found that 15% of the general population reported 
holding strong anti-Semitic views (Anti-Defamation League, 2007).  Additionally, 
approximately 70% of all religious hate crimes committed in 2007 were against Jews 
(Gimpson, 2008).  Such discrimination may encourage the formation of weak ties 
amongst the Jewish community by bonding over their historical and modern inequity.  
According to the theory of homophily, individuals of similar attributes are more likely to 
connect with each other (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001).  Mehra, Kildruff & 
Brass (1998) provide support for this theory in finding that individuals of racial and 
gender minority groups were more likely to form social bonds with similar individuals in 
both a work and academic context.  Such network formation was highly attributed to 
individual preferences for friends with common backgrounds and exclusionary practices 
by majority group members.  Bernard Madoff provides an excellent example of a 
minority who surrounded himself with others of a similar background.  Madoff was a 
child of the 1940s, when private organizations like schools, country clubs and 
neighborhoods discriminated more heavily against Jews.  Madoff was likely unable to 
expand his social network as a child, only furthering his propensity to build notably 
stronger networks with other Jewish Americans.  Later, Madoff became a member of the 
Board of Trustees for Yeshiva University, was heavily involved in Jewish non-profit 
work and professed his devotion to Jewish religious circles (Chibber, 2009).   
C.  The Effects of Distance on Social Network Strength 16 
 
Historically, social distance has been widely accepted as a feature of social 
networks.  Social distance was first introduced in Simmel’s analysis of “the stranger,” in 
which he argues that there is an optimal distance for individuals to keep between 
themselves and acquaintances (Simmel, 1950).  The definition has been refined and now 
often refers to the similarity of individuals based on demographic characteristics (Poole, 
1927).  Most commonly known, however, is Bogardus’ Social Distance Scale, which asks 
questions related to willingness to participate in different social activities with other 
individuals such as being neighbors, marrying and working together.  Scores from this 
scale can be summed and used to calculate how individuals perceive other groups and 
how willing these individuals are to interact with differing groups (Bogardus, 1926).  
Important characteristics of social distance include race, ethnicity, economic resources, 
social background and gender.   
Closeness centrality, or social distance, likewise has been found to contribute to 
the strength of social networking.  Hipp & Perrin (2009) find that as social distance 
between individuals in a neighborhoods increases, the likelihood of strong or weak ties 
forming significantly decreases.  Research has also suggested that individuals minimize 
interaction with more distant individuals because there is a direct relationship between 
physical distance and costs of maintaining ties, ceteris paribus (Zipf, 1949).  While the 
costs of maintaining ties may be decreasing with the growing ability of technology to 
connect individuals, this relationship still seems to hold, as an equivalent decrease in 
network ties is equal to either a 10% change in the social distance or a 5.6% increase in 
physical distance (Hipp & Perrin, 2009).  This is consistent with the observed spatial 
distribution of Madoff victims.  Specifically, the most physically distant counties from 17 
 
Madoff’s homes and office have many fewer Madoff investors, presumably due to the 
lack of social ties and social similarity to Madoff.  Therefore, the presence of any Madoff 
victims in a distant area might suggest the presence of developed networks through which 
information and (misplaced) trust in Madoff could spread rapidly.    
The homophily principle states that the flow of information between individuals is a 
declining function of social distance (McPherson & Ranger-Moore, 1991).  Essentially, 
this suggests that as social distance increases (i.e., people become increasingly 
dissimilar), people are less likely to interact and exchange information.  Homophily has 
been demonstrated in racial diversity of school friendships (Quillian and Campbell, 2003; 
Mouw and Entwisle, 2006), gender grouping in volunteer organizations (McPherson & 
Smith-Lovin, 1987) and interracial professional relations at work (Bacharach, Bamberger 
& Vashdi, 2005).  Lazersfeld & Merton (1954) even distinguished homophily effects 
based on individual’s social status (occupation or group membership) and social values, 
important abstract standards that dictate decision making (individualism or aggression).  
Social networks may provide an opportunity for offenders to interact with victims (Eck & 
Clarke, 2003).  Ultimately, social distance between offender and victim may be a 
significant factor in determining likelihood of white collar victimization (Benson, 
Madensen & Eck, 2009). 
The effect of propinquity, physical distance, on social network strength is 
extremely important when considering Madoff’s potential abuse of a social network.  
Caplow and Forman (1950) showed that married couples in college dorms were more 
likely to befriend other couples who were more physically proximate.  Similarly, 
Festinger, Schacter and Back (1950) demonstrated the same relationship by studying 18 
 
friendships in apartment buildings.  Individuals were most likely to be friends with their 
neighbors and least likely to be friends with people on different floors of the building 
(Festinger et al., 1950). This implies that areas with high concentrations of Jewish 
Americans may have been particularly vulnerable to Madoff because word of Madoff 
would have spread more quickly in these densely Jewish areas and individuals may have 
been more likely to follow their peers’ suggestions to invest with Madoff.  
Within criminological theory, physical proximity is related to the frequency of 
street crimes in both crime pattern theory and situational crime prevention theory.  
According to crime pattern theory, crimes are more likely to be committed in locations 
that are familiar to the offender.  For example, an analysis of robberies in Chicago 
illustrates that robbers were more likely to travel further to an area that was similar to 
their own neighborhood rather than rob an individual that was physically closer but 
demographically different (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991).  Situational crime 
prevention theory, on the other hand, suggests that an increase in physical distance acts as 
a deterrent to commit a crime.  Empirically, physical proximity to offenders is a positive 
predictor of street crime (Capone & Nichols 1976; Bernasco & Block, 2009).  Again, this 
trend is consistent with Madoff data as the counties with highest victim rates are 
relatively close to Madoff’s homes. 
D.  The Effects of Networks on Trust 
Both strong and weak social network ties have a direct impact of trust.  Several 
studies have found that within businesses, weak ties and the ability to bridge networks are 
incredibly important in allowing Directors and Officers to influence decisions and shape 
policies in large, public companies (Burt, 2005; Coleman 1988).  However, research 19 
 
examining board members of private companies, similar in size to Madoff’s firm, suggest 
that strong ties are also critical to building trusting relationships within a network 
(Stevenson & Radin, 2009).  Moreover, Berardo (2009) examined 22 communities across 
the nation and has suggested that network centrality greatly improves trust within a 
network.  He finds that groups with increased centrality have more trusting relationships.  
Trusting relationships may lead individuals or firms to perform repeat transactions with 
the same individual/firm because the trusting relationship will lower transaction costs so 
significantly that this option becomes the most efficient solution (Granovetter, 1985), 
These findings have also been generalized to community relationships and friendships 
(Karlan et al., 2009).  Therefore, one might expect Jewish Americans to have some trust 
for other Jewish Americans through weak ties; the existence of strong ties within local 
Jewish communities would reinforce preexisting weak-tie trust.  As I will discuss in 
further detail, this trust may have lead to less monitoring by investors, allowing Madoff 
to escape undetected until his collapse.   
The propagation of trust through social networks has serious consequences on 
individuals’ sources of information and outcome perspectives.  The problems associated 
with decision-making are commonly divided into two categories: questions of uncertainty 
(i.e., a lack of sufficient information on how to do something) and questions of ambiguity 
(i.e., sufficient information but the decision is difficult) (Saint Charles & Mongeau, 
2009).  Saint Charles & Mongeau (2009) find that individuals dealing with questions of 
uncertainty often turn toward perceived experts in the field with whom they often share 
weak ties.  However, people rely on friends and family (strong ties) for questions of 
ambiguity.  Additionally, individuals who are only distantly connected to a subject tend 20 
 
to have unrealistically positive views (Smith-Doerr, Manev & Rizova, 2004).  In the 
context of the Madoff Scheme, individuals who were unsure of where to invest their 
money (a question of uncertainty) may have acted on the advice of experts within their 
social network and overvalued the quality of Madoff’s work.  This could have lead to 
reduced efforts exerted by investors in monitoring the performance of their assets.  
Moreover, if individuals were unsure of how much to invest (a question of ambiguity), 
they likely would have consulted their friends.  By consulting other Jewish Americans on 
both with whom to invest and how much to invest, Jewish individuals may have suffered 
particularly heavily.  
E.  White-collar Crime & Religion 
The fact that the network I explore is religiously based warrants further 
discussion.  Studies have demonstrated in experimental settings that appealing to 
potential criminals’ sense of religion or morality significantly decreases individuals’ 
propensity to commit crime (Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2008).  Levitt (2006) reaffirmed 
this finding through an investigation of crime and changes in public opinion.  
Interestingly, an appeal to moral codes (e.g. religion) seems to be more effective at 
deterring crime than threats of reputation costs (Schneider, 2009), formal legal penalties 
(Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2008), and the probability of being caught (Levitt, 2006).  In 
order for crimes of trust to occur, the victim must have some reason to believe the 
offender is acting in good faith.  Because a shared social network can promote trust 
between the offender and the victim, the strength of both weak and strong ties may 
increase the likelihood of white-collar crime.  The net effect of Jewish network strength 21 
 
on Madoff victimization is therefore theoretically unclear and thus warrants further 
investigation.   
  22 
 
III.  DATA 
 
A.  Dataset Description 
 
  To construct a measure of Jewish network strength, I rely on a series of pre-
constructed datasets.  The first measure of Jewish network strength is the Urban 
Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics’ count of religious non-profit 
organizations per county.  The data, created from organizations’ 990 tax returns, include 
the total number of organizations in each county, the total revenue of religious non-
profits in a county, the total assets of religious nonprofits in a county, the religious 
affiliation of each non-profit and total donations made by religious non-profits in a 
county.  These data are separately provided for Jewish organizations as well.  Because 
religious organizations are not required to file a Form 990 with the Internal Revenue 
Service, some counties may have an undercount of the number of Jewish nonprofits.  
Similarly, because tax laws of particular states and counties may be correlated with these 
non-profit measures as well as the number of Madoff investors, there is a potential for 
bias in my estimates.   
  To generate my dependent variables, I use data from a list of 13,563 individual 
Madoff victims that was generated by the SIPC, court-appointed attorney and trustee of 
Madoff LLC’s remaining holdings.
3  This list contains individuals’ names and addresses.  
It should be noted that there were some duplicates in this list; however, media outlets 
such as the Wall Street Journal and the Associated Press have speculated that this is 
because some individuals had multiple accounts over time, and not that these repeated 
listings were due to error (Wall Street Journal, 2009).  I include all duplicates reasoning 
                                                 
3 Data from the Uniform Crime Report cannot be used because it does not measure white-collar crime 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005).  Similarly, the National Crime Victimization Survey is of little use 
as most victims of white-collar crime do not know they are a victim to such crime. 23 
 
that any miscounts are classical measurement error in the dependent variable.  My 
dependent variable related to non-profit organizations comes from a complete list of all 
148 non-profit organizations that used Madoff LLC as their investment manager.  In this 
list, generated by a consultant to the New York Times, each non-profit organization is 
listed along with its business address, total assets, total revenue, and the amount invested 
in Madoff LLC as of the most recently completed IRS Form 990 filing.  From these two 
data sources, I can create my dependent measures: 1) a binary measure for the presence 
of any Madoff victims in a county, 2) a count of individual Madoff victims per county 
and 3) a count of non-profit Madoff victims per county. 
To address these issues, I include two additional measures of Jewish network 
strength that are likely unaffected by tax regulations.  The second source of network 
measurement is the number of Kosher restaurants and catering halls in a county.  I argue 
that the number of Kosher eating establishments is positively correlated with the size of a 
Jewish social network.  The database I used was maintained by Hebrew College, 
supplemented by a series of nationally recognized Kosher-certification organizations (e.g. 
Star-K) and was current as of July 2009.  I find that the number of kosher restaurants per 
county is highly correlated with the number of Jewish religious non-profits (ρ=0.74) and 
the revenue of those non-profits (ρ=0.75).  However, the correlation between kosher 
restaurants and religious non-profits generally is weaker, with ρ equal to 0.65 and 0.46 
respectively.  Lastly, I include the number of the Jewish Community Centers and Young 
Men’s Hebrew Associations in each county.  These data come from the national JCC 24 
 
Association and were current as of July 2009.
4  The correlation between the number of 
JCCs per county and the number of kosher restaurants is relatively strong (ρ=.67).  While 
the number of JCCs per county is highly correlated with the number of religious 
organizations per county (ρ=.70), it is more weakly correlated with the per-county 
number of Jewish religious organizations (ρ=.48), the revenue of those Jewish nonprofits 
(ρ=.48) religious profits as a whole (ρ=.45).  These correlations suggest that the number 
of JCCs may be a measure of another aspect of the Jewish social network, as they are at 
least not linearly related to the number or strength of Jewish nonprofit organizations yet 
clearly are a part of the Jewish social network. 
  Since one would reasonably expect that Madoff victims were more likely to be in 
wealthier and physically closer areas, it is important to control for such effects.  While 
annual Census Bureau estimates of the number of impoverished households per county 
are easily accessible, the same is not true for estimates of the number wealthy 
households.  To overcome this obstacle, I estimate cross-sectional variation in high 
income through the number of doctors per county in 2007 and the number of households 
over grossing over $200k annually in the year 2000.
5  The county level measures are 
taken from the Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Resources Survey and 
the 2000 Decennial Census provide these data, respectively.  Although clearly neither 
estimate is a perfect measure of high-income individuals in 2007, examining the 
sensitivity of my results to either definition will help quantify the magnitude of the 
                                                 
4 Attempts to incorporate Jewish population estimates were unsuccessful as the U.S. Census does not ask 
for individuals to identify their religion and estimates from the American Jewish Committee’s American 
Jewish Year Book were at varying and inconsistent geographic levels.  
 
5 In 2000, the correlation between the number of doctors and the number of households with over $200K in 
income was over 0.9.           25 
 
measurement error.  Population and income measures are from the U.S. Census and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  To calculate the physical distance of potential victims from 
Madoff, I use geographic population weighted county centroids as calculated by the US 
Census Bureau.  Centroid calculations are based upon information from the 2000 Census.  
I use Vincenty’s formula to calculate these distances.
6  
B.  Descriptive Statistics 
  While not taking into account the effects of wealth, descriptive statistics related to 
the geographic distribution of Madoff victims and the frequency and sizes of the various 
proxies for Jewish American social network strength are informative (Table 2).  Quite 
noticeably, there were very few counties with Madoff victims (N=308) (Figure 1).  
Moreover, the 148 non-profit victims were limited to only 41 counties.  As depicted in 
Figure 1, victims were particularly concentrated in the New York City, NY; Palm Beach, 
FL and Denver, CO metropolitan areas (Figure 2).  On average, counties with any 
Madoff investors had significantly more victims (33.9) than the national average (3.33).  
The counties with Madoff victims help also contained 0.6 Jewish nonprofit organizations, 
on average.  These same counties had Jewish organizations that grossed larger revenue 
and more religious organizations overall.  Madoff-affected counties averaged 5.7 kosher 
restaurants, and 0.57 JCCs or YMHAs.  All of these statistics are significantly different 
from the means of these variables for unaffected counties.  The large number of zero-
victim counties, however, necessitates cautious economic modeling.   
  
                                                 
6Vincenty’s formula, which accounts for the oblate spheroid shape of Earth, is commonly used as it has 
been proven to be the most accurate compared to other methods.  Calculations are accurate to 0.005mm. 26 
 
IV.  ANALYTIC STRATEGY: 
Approximately 90% of all US counties had no Madoff victims.  Meanwhile, 2.7% 
of counties had one victim and 2.6% of counties had 11 or more victims, with an average 
of 116 victims per county.  Due to this skewed distribution of victimization, I am 
interested in measuring factors that increased the probability of a county having any 
victims as well as what factors increased the total number of victims per county.  I first 
estimate the importance of Jewish networks using a standard logit model that relates the 
extensive margin, or the probability of there being any Madoff victims in county c, to a 
set of demographic characteristics Xc, the strength of Jewish networks in that county 
Religionc, the number of kosher restaurants in a county Kosherc and the existence of a 
Jewish Community Center JCCc as follows:      
(1) 
() ( ) []
() []
1 JCC ' Kosher ' Religion ' Distance ' exp 1
* JCC ' Kosher ' Religion ' Distance ' exp
− + + + + +
+ + + + =
c c c c c
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τ ρ θ κ γ
 
  I model the number of victims (i.e., the intensive margin) in a given county using 
a series of count models.  In the first and most basic specification, I use a negative 
binomial count model, a generalized version of the Poisson count model.  This model of 
the number of victims is: 
(2)  () c c c c c c e X Victim JCC ' Kosher ' Religion ' Distanc ' exp τ ρ β λ δ α + + + + + =   
 Where  Victimc is the number of investors (individual or organizational) in county 
c.
7 There are several important independent variables in each of the models.  Distance c 
measures the physical distance between the population weighted county centerand 
                                                 
7 I do not specify any independent variables that could affect whether there are any victims in a county but 
not the number of victims, conditional on vc being greater than zero.  Neither economic theory nor 
institutional information directs me to any such variables.  Instead, I allow the relationship between Xc and 
Networkc to vary on the intensive (θ) and extensive (β) margins.   27 
 
Madoff’s nearest residence or office.
   Networkc,is the measure of the concentration of 
Jewish religious organizations in county c. I use four different measures of Religion: the 
number of Jewish religious organizations in the county, the percentage of organizations 
in a county that are Jewish, the total revenue of all Jewish organizations in fiscal year 
2008 per county and the total number of religious organizations per county in 2008.  An 
increase in the number of Jewish religious organizations should be positively correlated 
with both stronger Jewish informal networks and an increase in individual religious 
participation.  However, contributions to religious organizations, which would also signal 
strong network presence in the community, have been shown to be a substitute for 
religious participation [Gruber (2005)].  A positive correlation between the number of 
victims and each of the Religion measures would suggest that religious devotion and 
participation is associated with increased vulnerability to being a Madoff victim.  
I include JCCc  and Kosherc in order to account for ethnic Jewish network 
strength.  Unlike data on religious organizations, the number of kosher restaurants and 
JCCs should be largely independent of county and state tax laws.  Moreover, although 
JCCs commonly have a religious aspect to the organization, they are primarily locations 
for members to socialize in a non-religious context (e.g. friends going to the gym 
together) and these organizations often have non-Jewish members.  Historically, JCCs, 
many of which were formerly called YMHAs (Young Men’s Hebrew Associations) were 
established as opposition to the nation’s YMCAs.  The number of kosher restaurants 
represents a bridge between religious and ethnic network strength, as those who keep 
kosher are likely more religious Jews, while restaurants are commonly associated with 
friendship networks, regardless of religious affiliation.  JCCc is a count variable for the 28 
 
number of JCCs within county c and Kosherc is a count of the number of kosher 
restaurants in county c.  A positive correlation between either or both of these variables 
would suggest that increased Jewish ethnic and cultural networks increased susceptibility 
to white-collar crime.  In order to test how these network measures change with 
closeness, I will explore possible heterogeneity in the impact of the social networks with 
respect to distance by interacting my network measures with physical distance.
8   
I control for multiple potentially confounding variables.  X is a matrix of county 
characteristics including: the log of the county population, the log of median household 
income, the percent of the county’s population that is White (non-Hispanic), the percent 
of the county’s population that is over 65, the percent of the population that is over 65 
and have a college degree and either the percent of households earning more than $200k 
in 2000 or the number of doctors per county in 2007.  The final two measures in 
particular I predict should be highly correlated with white-collar crime victimization, as 
they are likely to be predictors of participation in financial markets.   
An important distinction to note when estimating crime related measures is the 
difference between a marginal crime and the average crime.  Using the Madoff scandal as 
an example, a marginal victim would be a victim that is least likely to be victimized 
given a change in practices, whereas the average victim is the victim with characteristics 
that are the average of all known victims.  This difference can result in sizeable 
differences in estimates of victimization.  For example, in criminal incarceration data the 
average inmate in state prison may commit 12 crimes per year (DiIulio & Piehl, 1991; 
DiIulio & Piehl, 1995), but the marginal prisoner affected by a sentence enhancement 
                                                 
8 In practice, I do this by calculating the value of ∂
2Victim/∂{Network Measure}∂Distance for each 
observation and will present these mean values.  Since neither model is linear, calculating the means of the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term is not the same magnitude or sign as the cross partial effect.     29 
 
will likely commit only 1 crime per year (Owens, 2009).  As the Becker model of 
criminal behavior postulates, the marginal crimes that are deterred by increases in the 
probability of apprehension will be the least beneficial to the victim, and likely the least 
harmful to the criminal (Becker, 1968).  Such a model suggests that the marginal 
victim/crime and average victim/criminal may be fundamentally different.  Therefore, for 
policy purposes, crime rates are typically better characterized by average characteristics 
rather than marginal characteristics.  
While equation (2) uses more information on Madoff victimization, it is notable 
that the logit equations capture a large fraction of the total variation in victimization rates 
across counties.  A-priori, it is unclear whether the effect of social networks on the 
probability of there being any victims in a county is that same as the effect on the number 
of victims.  In order to assure that my estimates are not driven by misspecification of the 
victimization process, I will estimate three separate count models: a sub-sample of only 
counties with any victims, the full set of counties and full sample zero-inflated negative 
binomial.  Using a zero-inflated negative binomial will allow me to relax the assumption 
that a constant relationship on the extensive and intensive margins exists. 
  The key coefficients are θ, β, ρ and τ, the estimates of the conditional correlation 
between informal religious social networks and victimization.  If, on net, participation in 
a religious and ethnic informal network is associated with greater risk of white-collar 
crime, then the estimates of θ, β,ρ and τ will be greater than zero.  Records of Madoff 
victims include both individual account holders and non-profit organizations.  It seems 
plausible that individuals would be more influenced by informal networks than would 
corporations.  In addition, the financial decisions made by non-profit board members are 30 
 
subject to regulation by the Internal Revenue Service and Better Business Bureau.  If 
these regulatory agencies constrained the firm’s behavior, the pattern of non-profit 
victimization should be less related to Jewish network strength.  I predict that informal 
networks will better predict patterns of white-collar victimization for individual accounts 
than organizations’ accounts. 
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V.  RESULTS: 
A.  Jewish Networks & The Probability of Victimization 
 i. ALL INVESTORS: 
  I begin my analysis of the relationship between social networks and white collar 
crime victimization on the extensive margin.  I report the mean marginal effects for the 
probability of any Madoff victims in a given county in Table 2.  Results show that there 
is a positive relationship between the number of Jewish organizations and the likelihood 
of a Madoff victim in a county.  On average, every ten new Jewish organization is 
associated with a 9 percentage point (se=3) increase in the likelihood of Madoff victims.  
Additionally, as criminal opportunity and social networking theory would predict, 
physical distance is consistently negatively associated with probability of victimization.  
Also worth noting, is that the percent of senior citizens with a college degree is a positive 
predictor of victimization.  Though this contradicts traditional thought regarding the size 
of the educated senior population and traditional street crime, a positive relationship 
between the educated senior population and white collar crime has been widely 
demonstrated (Shover, 1998).  Also consistent with theories of social distance and crime, 
areas with higher percentages of wealthy households is significantly related to the 
probability of victimization.  For instance, in Model 1, an increase of 1% in the 
households making more than 200k is associated with a 1.89% point (se=0.50) increase 
in the likelihood of a victim.  These last two relationships hold for analysis using all 
Jewish network measures.  Upon first glance, Madoff may have been exploiting both 
Jewish and high-income social networks. 32 
 
  To further evaluate the validity of this statement, I consider both the relative 
number of Jewish organizations to other religious organizations and those organizations’ 
size, as measured by revenue.  Model 2 includes the total number of religious 
organizations and the percentage of Jewish organizations in a county.  Thus, one can 
consider the Jewish organization ratio variable as a change in the affiliation of one of the 
organizations in the county.  According to the regression, for every 1% increase in the 
percent of Jewish organizations in a county, there is approximately a 0.8% (se=0.23)  
point increase in the likelihood of having Madoff victims in a county.  The fact that this 
relationship exists while there is no relationship between probability of victimization and 
the total number of religious organizations in a county further may support the idea that 
Madoff specifically targeted Jews and also may support the argument that Jews were 
seeking out Madoff.  Otherwise, one would have necessarily seen a relationship between 
likelihood of victimization and the total number of religious organizations and may have 
seen a relationship between victimization and the percentage of Jewish organizations.  A 
similar relationship exists in Model 3, where conditional on the total revenue of religious 
organizations, a 1% change in religious revenue being redirected to Jewish organizations 
is associated with a 0.15% point increase in the probability of victimization.  While total 
revenue is the amount of money an organization has, it also can be considered a measure 
for the visibility of an organization.  For example, organizations with higher revenues are 
more likely to have public functions, like religious schooling, fairs and community 
outreach.   
  Using the alternative methods of measuring Jewish social networks, the number 
of Kosher restaurants (Model 4) and the number of JCCs (Model 5), I find consistent 33 
 
results.  For each additional Kosher restaurant in a county, there is a 2.7% point (se=0.6) 
increase in the likelihood of victimization.  In addition, each JCC in a county translates 
into a 5.6% point (se=1.5) increase in the likelihood of a victim.  These results are 
particularly interesting as they show that regardless of local or state tax benefits that a 
religious institution would have, the number of religiously affiliated businesses and 
meeting areas can be used to predict Madoff victimization.  The combination of these and 
prior results, including a joint test that all network measures are equal to zero, which is 
rejected at the 99.99% confidence level, suggests that Madoff was targeting Jews as 
potential victims.  
To evaluate my hypotheses related to physical proximity, I focus my analyses on 
the geographic distance measure.  Analyses reveal that each increase of 1,000km in the 
minimum distance between Madoff and a victim translates into roughly a 2% point 
decrease in the likelihood of victimization.  As Zapf (1949) argued, ceteris paribus, 
Madoff’s cost of contacting an individual should have increased proportional to the 
distance between him and the individual.  Thus, an analysis of the interaction of each 
network measure and distance is appropriate.  Figure 3 shows a sizeable level of 
heterogeneity in the effect of proximity on social networks.  As distance increases, the 
effect of Jewish organizations on victimization falls faster in places where there is the 
lowest probability of victimization.  However, in likely areas of Madoff victimization 
(i.e. high levels of income, education) that are physically distant from Madoff, the 
positive relationship between Jewish organizations and victimization is ever larger than it 
is in areas close to Madoff.  Therefore, the predictive power of social network variables 
related to Madoff become increasingly large as physical distance increases.   34 
 
Similar patterns of heterogeneity when measuring informal networks using the 
percentage of all religious organizations that are Jewish (Figure 4), the percent of all 
religious revenue that goes towards Jewish organizations (Figure 5), the number of 
Kosher restaurants (Figure 6) and the number of JCCs (Figure 7).  The measure that was 
most correlated with victimization on average, the fraction of religious organizations that 
were Jewish, appears to decay the least with geographic distance. I can reject the null 
hypothesis that these informal networks do not decay with distance with 95% confidence 
in only the areas with the lowest probability of victimization.   
While the estimated relationships are in large highly significant and robust to 
measures of distance and income, in order to verify these results, I substituted the number 
of doctors in 2007 for the percent of households with incomes over $200 thousand 
counted in the 2000 Decennial Census.  As I have previously mentioned, the two 
variables in the year 2000 are highly correlated (r>.90).  Thus, using the 2007 count of 
the number of doctors may provide a more current estimate of the number of wealthy 
individuals in a county.  By rerunning the same logistic models with the number of 
doctors as the measure of county wealth, I find very similar results.  In each case, the 
pseudo R-squared is similar in magnitude, often deviating by less than 0.10.  
Additionally, a visual comparison of the signs and magnitudes of coefficient estimates 
yield consistent results.  For all estimates in all models, signs and magnitudes are 
consistent.  For example, each additional Jewish organization increases the probability 
ofa county having a Madoff victim by 0.9% points (se = 0.3).  Moreover, each 1% 
increase in the number of Jewish organizations, holding the total number of religious 
organizations constant, results in a 0.88% point (se=0.18) increase in the probability of a 35 
 
Madoff victim and a 1% increase in the percent of revenue going to a Jewish religious 
organization results in a 0.13% point (se=0.41) increase in the likelihood of Madoff 
victimization.  Differences in these estimates compared to previous models are 
negligible.  Similar comparisons also hold for estimates using the number of Kosher 
restaurants
9 (β=0.025, se=0.007) and the number of JCCs per county (β=0.050, se=0.016) 
(Table 8).  These comparisons further demonstrate that the previously discussed estimates 
of likelihood of Madoff victimization based upon my independent variables are robust. 
 ii. NON-PROFIT INVESTORS: 
 
The likelihood of non-profit victimization is likely different from that of 
individual and overall victimization patterns.  Such differences may be explained because 
non-profit organizations’ (NPO’s) decisions to invest often fall to a board of directors.  
These choices are also often subject to government regulation and oversight.  Therefore, 
there is a duty of a company’s officers to investigate more heavily into potential 
investments.  Moreover, majority consent is often required in Board structures and so 
unlike where one individual may decide whether to invest, multiple individuals here must 
agree before action is taken.  However, NPO Boards are often full of high-status 
individuals, who are more likely to be familiar with Madoff.  These stronger distant 
connections may have lead NPOs to invest more with Madoff.  Therefore, based upon the 
ambiguous net effect of NPO Boards on Madoff victimization, I choose to run separate 
analyses on this subset of victims. 
  Results displayed in Table 4 suggest that differences in victimization patterns 
likely do exist.  In fact, all three religious organization measures (the number of Jewish 
                                                 
9 Analyses using the percent of kosher restaurants per county yield similar results in sign and magnitude for 
all analyses. 36 
 
organizations, their relative revenues and their relative prevalence per county) are all 
indistinguishable from zero.  Moreover, the number of kosher restaurants plays an 
insignificant role in modeling victimization.  Intuitively this seems logical, as an NPO is 
less likely affected by small business and community relationships than would be 
individuals.  However, the number of JCCs in a county is a significant predictor in the 
probability of Madoff victimization.  Following the results in Table 4, each JCC accounts 
for an approximate 0.4% point (se=0.2) increase in the likelihood that a Madoff victim 
will be in a given county.  Additionally, geographic distance from Madoff continues to 
play a distinct, significant role in the likelihood of victimization with the likelihood of 
victimization decreasing by 0.3% points (se=0.01) for every 1,000km the county is from 
Madoff’s closest home location.  Also worth noting, with the exception of seniors with at 
least a college degree, the demographic characteristics of the county, including wealth, 
become insignificant predictors.  Presumably, the average NPO is more detached from its 
surrounding community, so one would expect these local networks to play a weak role, if 
any, in corporate investments.   
Further consideration suggests the differences in the relationship between Jewish 
religious institutions and geographic distance for non-profit and individual victims.  
Unlike in individual victim analysis, where a clear upward sloping trend existed between 
physical distance and strengthening of the informal networks was present, on average 
there is no significant spatial deterioration or strengthening of the informal networks.  
One exception does hold.  That is, in counties with approximately a 60% chance of 
victimization, the predicative power of Jewish network strength, particularly as measured 
by the fraction of organizations that are Jewish, is higher in areas located further from 37 
 
Madoff.  Overall, one can summarize these findings by stating that in counties distant 
from Madoff, where the observed predictors do not clearly predict victimization, the 
proxy for the strength of weak ties is a better predictor of victimization. 
B.  Jewish Networks & The Amount of Victimization 
Having established the positive relationship between Jewish social network 
measures and the likelihood of Madoff victimization in a county, I now examine the 
intensive margin of victimization.  I conduct these analyses because it seems unclear 
whether the probability of any victimization in a county and the level of victimization, 
measured in quantity of investors, should be the same.  I model the number of victims in 
a county in three ways. First, I restrict the sample to only counties with any Madoff 
victims (Models 1 and 4).  Next, I estimate model (2) and (5) for all counties, which 
considers all counties, regardless of the number of Madoff victims.  These models restrict 
the coefficients of equation (1) and equation (2) to be equal by imposing the assumption 
that θ = β.  Finally, I present results from a zero inflated negative binomial model 
(Models 3 and 6).  This essentially process produces weighted averages of the results of 
models (1) and (2).  This specification allows for variation in the effects of Madoff on the 
intensive and extensive margins of victimization.   
 i. ALL INVESTORS 
 
Table 6 displays partial elasticities for the various count models, where the 
number of all Madoff investors in a county is the dependent variable in each model.  
Previously, in the logistic analyses, the number of Jewish organizations predicted the 
likelihood of there being any victims.  However, models using this network measure to 
estimate the increase in victimization rates (the top panel) prove to be statistically 38 
 
indistinguishable from zero.  In summary, areas with more Jewish organizations were 
more likely to have at least one victim, but in areas where network ties did exist seem to 
have no measurable effect on increasing the victimization rate. 
Although increasing the total number of Jewish organizations had no effect on 
victimization rates, the conversion of one non-Jewish organization to a Jewish 
organization does impact the number of victims (the second panel).  A one standard 
deviation (2.2% point) increase in the percent of organizations that are Jewish is 
associated with a roughly 28% increase in the number of victims when there is at least 
one victim in a county, a 51% increase in the overall number of victims, or a 31% 
increase when one allows for a structural break between the intensive and extensive 
margins.  Undoubtedly, these effects are quite sizeable and suggest that the relative 
concentration of Jewish social networks in an area plays an important role when 
considering the quantity of victimization in a county. 
Using relative revenue to measure network strength (bottom panel) reveals similar 
results.  Conditional on the total revenue of religious organization in the county, a one 
standard deviation (5.6 percentage points) increase in the fraction of revenue which goes 
to Jewish organizations is associated with a 26% increase in victimization among 
victimized counties.  Combining the intensive and extensive margins provides a slightly 
larger increase, 28%.  Nonetheless, the difference between these estimates is not 
statistically significant.  The relative magnitudes of both the revenue based and 
institutional based effects are the same for the extensive and intensive margins.   
Similar to the results when examining the relationship between victimization 
levels and the  number of Jewish organizations, I find no significant relationship for the 39 
 
number of JCCs or Kosher restaurants in a county and victimization rates.  This supports 
the pattern that the absolute number of Jewish-American organizations does not affect 
Madoff victimization.  Each of these findings is robust to the inclusion of measures of 
population age, education, median income and wealth.  Indeed, the best predictors of 
determining the intensity of Madoff victimization is relative strength of Jewish social 
networks compared to other religious networks. 
   Physical distance, as measured in this study, between Madoff and his victims is a 
consistent predictor of extensive victimization, but there is no statistically precise 
relationship between distance and the number of victims in a county.  More notably, 
however, there is significant heterogeneity in the predictive value of religious ties with 
respect to geography.  Inspection of counties that had at least one victim (column 4) 
shows that the interaction between concentration based measures of network strength and 
geographic distance is positive and statistically different from zero over 95% of the time.  
In other words, as one moves further from Madoff, the fraction of all religious 
organizations and the fraction of all revenue going to Jewish organizations become 
stronger predictors of the number of victims.  Consistent with network theory, geographic 
closeness of Madoff to potential victims and Jewish network strength appear to be 
substitutes in predicting victimization.  The importance of this interaction effect is 
weaker when determining the probability of there being any victims, as the interaction 
effect is generally statistically insignificant when the intensive and extensive effects are 
restricted to be equal.  Relax this restriction (column 6), however, shows that the 
concentration of Jewish organizations and Jewish religious revenue is positively 40 
 
correlated with county victimization, and the magnitude of this relationship is larger the 
further away one moves from Madoff. 
  Again, these results seem to be robust to the substitution of the number of wealthy 
households per county in the year 2000 with the number of doctors per county.  Again, 
the signs, magnitudes and significance of each of the mean partial elasticities are roughly 
equal.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in the percent of Jewish 
organizations in a county for counties with any Madoff victims is associated with a 
27.5% increase in the number of Madoff investors, compared to the previously computed 
28% using household wealth as the measure.  There are also only marginal increases in 
the number of victims per county when examining relative Jewish revenue in counties: 
using wealth data, the estimate is a 26% increase in the number of victims compared to a 
24% increase when using the number of doctors per county.  Again, there are no 
significant relationships between the number of victims and the number of Jewish 
organizations, number of kosher restaurants or the number of JCCs in a county.  
Measures of heterogeneity do differ when using the number of doctors as the measure of 
wealth in a county.  Although there is a significant relationship between the interaction of 
distance and the percent of Jewish organizations, the interaction between distance and 
relative revenue is statistically imprecise.  However, the partial elasticity for the 
interaction of the number of JCCs and distance is significant.  Overall, there is little 
change to the previously discussed findings when one considers the alternative measure 
of wealth in a county.  
 ii. NON-PROFIT INVESTORS 
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  Table 7 displays the results of examining the number of non-profit victims on the 
intensive margin.  Similarly, to the individual victim intensive margin, the number of 
Jewish organizations, the number of kosher restaurants and the number of JCCs in a 
county are largely insignificant.  In the case of the absolute number of Jewish 
organizations, in addition to being insignificant, the magnitude of the partial elasticities is 
inconsequential.  Furthermore, there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
concentration of Jewish organizations and the number of victims. 
In stark contrast, the fraction of revenue generated by Jewish organizations is a 
sizeable predictor of non-profit victimization.  Recall that the revenue measure was a 
weak, but positive, correlate with the probability of their being any Madoff victims.  In 
contrast, a one standard deviation (0.7% point) increase in the relative amount of 
religious revenue going to Jewish organization results in between a 3% and 4% increase 
on the intensive margin, depending on the victimization model used.  These results 
suggest that while the relative revenue was a weak predictor of there being any victims in 
a county, once there was at least one victim, this variable becomes an important predictor 
in estimating the total number of victims. 
Unlike individual victimization, there is no strong spatial heterogeneity in the 
relationship between networks and organizational victims.  Statistically significant spatial 
heterogeneity occurs in less than 17% of the sample’s observations, and it is generally 
weakly negative, suggesting that network strength is weaker as one moves away from 
Madoff.  It is important to note that non-profit locations in this data set are dependent on 
the corporate address of the non-profit, which may be weakly or unrelated to board 
members’ addresses.  As a result, distance may be imprecisely measured and may 42 
 
introduce attenuation bias in my estimates of the effect of geographic closeness, making 
it more difficult to identify a non-zero relationship.  Again, all intensive margin estimates 
of non-profit victimization are robust to the substitution of the county wealth measure 
with the number of doctors in a county. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION  
Typically when one thinks of white collar crime, Nigerian scams and other 
telephone and Internet scams come to mind.  However, corporations commit most white 
collar crime (Posner, 1979).  As previously described, white collar crime is an abuse of 
trust (Shover, 1998).  Thus, social networks may play an important role in the incidence 
of white collar crime.  Prior to this study, however, the correlates of modern white collar 
crime were largely unknown as it is often difficult if not impossible to accurately measure 
or contact the victims of such offense.  As a result, testing the theoretical effects of 
inciting religion, social networks and distance on the commission of white collar crime is 
difficult.  In these ways, the Madoff case raised a particularly interesting opportunity to 
examine each of these questions.  
Results from this study show that social networks, particularly religious social 
networks, have serious consequences for both the probability of victimization and the 
intensity of victimization.  I show that despite the likely increased costs of investing with 
an unknown, risky investor, individuals in counties with strong Jewish social networks 
were more likely to invest with Madoff.  Moreover, I find that when the network, as 
measured by both the relative concentration of Jewish organizations and the relative 
revenue of Jewish organizations in a county, was stronger, more individuals invested with 
Madoff.  Thus, it seems prudent that individuals recognize the potentially negative effects 
of participating in transactions with individuals within their own social networks. 
This study also highlighted the effects of distance on victimization which Zipf 
(1949) so clearly asserted.  Examining the first order effect of distance, I find a 
consistently negative relationship between distance and likelihood and level of 44 
 
victimization.  However, this negative effect is often smaller than the positive 
relationships between victimization and network strength.  Continued analysis of the 
distance measure reveals a more meaningful description of distance’s relationship to 
victimization.  I find that as the physical distance from Madoff increased, the importance 
of Jewish network strength steadily increased.  This result suggests that victims likely 
increasingly relied on information passing through these networks as other possible 
routes to discerning the quality of Madoff’s firm became more costly.  I propose that 
individual investors’ reliance on information spread though the Jewish social network 
aided in Madoff’s commission of the largest Ponzi scheme in US history. 
  Relative to indirect victimization, Jewish network strength and the geographic 
distribution of non-profit Madoff victims are only weakly related.  In fact, a significant 
relationship exists between victimization and only the amount of revenue generated by 
Jewish organizations, not the number or concentration of those organizations.  I conclude 
that the boards of non-profit foundations rely less on informal networks than do 
individual investors in making investment decisions, and are therefore less susceptible to 
victimization in crimes of trust.  The fact that this relationship becomes weaker as the 
geographic distance between the non-profit and Madoff increases highlights that 
alternative personal connections between board members and Madoff may have played a 
role.    
While Madoff’s Ponzi scheme clearly had seriously negative consequences on the 
US economy and society, overall it provided an excellent opportunity to study and craft 
effective policy to prevent future white collar schemes.  This study has served to 
highlight that while inciting religion may help to decrease street crime, the use of religion 45 
 
can foster white collar schemes and victimization.  This suggests that there may be an 
increased purpose for the government to supervise organizations and individuals who are 
perceived to be associated with religious networks.  There also may be cause to terminate 
boutique investment firms’ exemptions from federal monitoring.  It seems quite plausible 
that had Madoff been required to submit to detailed federal oversight, he likely would not 
have been able to continue his scheme without detection.  Increased federal oversight 
would help limit the negative effects of asymmetric information on behalf of investors 
who do not realize there is a lack of oversight and investors who cannot accurately 
ascertain the value of the assets sold by firms like Madoff LLC.  In summation, this study 
highlights the importance of careful evaluation of investments rather than relying on 
information spread through informal, and likely ill-informed, social networks. 
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Figure 3: Heterogeneous Effects of the Number of Jewish Organizations on 
All Victimization 
 
 
Figure 4: Heterogeneous Effects of the Percent of Organizations that are Jewish on 
All Victimization 55 
 
Figure 5: Heterogeneous Effects of the Percent of all Revenue collected by Jewish 
Organizations on All Victimization 
 
 
Figure 6: Heterogeneous Effects of the Number of Kosher Restaurants on on All 
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Figure 7: Heterogeneous Effects of the Number of Jewish Community Centers on 
All Victimization 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Heterogeneous Effects of the Number of Jewish Organizations on 
Non-Profit Victimization 
 
 
 57 
 
 
Figure 9: Heterogeneous Effects of the Percent of Organizations that are Jewish on 
Non-Profit Victimization 
 
 
Figure 10: Heterogeneous Effects of the Percent of all Revenue collected by Jewish 
Organizations on Non-Profit Victimization 
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Figure 11: Heterogeneous Effects of the Number of Kosher Restaurants  
on Non-Profit Victimization 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Heterogeneous Effects of the Number of Jewish Community Centers 
on Non-Profit Victimization 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Madoff Victims and Victimization by County 
 All 
Counties 
n=3,141  
Any 
Clients 
n=308  
No 
Clients 
n= 2,833 
p(difference) = 
0 
Number of Clients 
3.33  33.9  0  .0000 
[49.7]  [156]  [0]   
Non-Profit Clients 
.0471  .464  .00177  .0000 
[.817]  [2.57]  [.062]   
Assets Invested with Madoff (10k) 
72.4  734  0.51  .0000 
[2,060]  [6,560]  [193]  
Religious Organizations, 2008 
68.0  368  35.4  .0000 
[242]  [669]  [74.7]   
Jewish Organizations, 2008 
1.86  17.6  0.148  .0000 
[31.2]  [98.4]  [0.816]   
Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations 
0.005  0.028  0.002  .0000 
[0.022]  [0.057]  [0.001]   
Revenue of Religious 
Organizations, 2008 (100k) 
43.1  303  14.9  .0000 
[269]  [777]  [79.7]   
Revenue of Jewish 
Organizations, 2008 (100k) 
2.18  21.4  0.956  .0000 
[36.7]  [116]  [1.56]   
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org. 
0.007  0.053  0.002  .0000 
[0.056]  [0.131]  [0.036]   
Kosher Restaurants, 2009 
.577  5.70  .0201  .0000 
[6.44]  [19.9]  [.209]   
JCC Organizations 
0.061  .565  .006 .0000 
[0.41]  [1.19]  [.082]   
Number of Doctors, 2007 
253   1776  88.13  .0000 
[1084]  [2943]  [293]  
Population, 2008 
96,803   519,698  50,827  .0000 
[312,135]  [830,013] [108,526]   
Per Capita Income, 2008 
42,705  55,875  41,274  .0000 
[10,959]  [14,587]  [9,443]  
Percent White, Non-Hispanic, 2007 
86.5  82.9  86.9  .0000 
[16.0]  [14.0]  [16.2]   
Standard deviations in brackets.  
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Table 2: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization: All Investors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Jewish Organizations  0.009         0.001 
[0.003]         [0.004] 
Jewish Organizations 
/ Religious 
Organizations  
 0.864        0.458 
 [0.231]        [0.249] 
Total Rev. of Jewish 
Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org. 
   0.152      0.070 
   [0.043]      [0.042] 
Religious 
Organizations 
 4.26x10
-5       -9.76x10
-6 
 [3.62  x10
-
5] 
     [  3.00x10
-
5] 
Total Revenue of 
Religious Org. (100k) 
   1.48x10
-10     5.70x10
-13 
   [1.12x10
-10]    [1.48x10
-
10] 
Kosher Restaurants       0.027  0.021 
     [0.006]    [0.007] 
JCC Organizations        0.056  0.024 
       [0.015]  [0.016] 
JCC Satellites        0.015  -0.050 
      [0.050]  [0.045] 
Geographic distance 
from Madoff 
-0.021 -0.020  -0.020  -0.017 -0.019 -0.016 
[0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
Ln(Median Income)  0.021 0.028  0.017  0.022 0.025  .030 
[0.024] [0.025]  [0.025]  [0.024] [0.249] [0.024] 
Percent White  0.071 0.051  0.057  0.077 0.072 0.068 
[0.041] [0.043]  [0.040]  [0.041] [0.043] [0.045] 
Percent 65+  -0.075 -0.008  -0.034  -0.072 -0.049 -0.062 
[0.133] [0.131]  [0.132]  [0.132] [0.133] [0.131] 
Percent of 65+ with 
college degree 
2.195 2.130  2.302  2.002 2.323 2.050 
[0.425] [0.446]  [0.439]  [0.460] [0.431] [0.419] 
Percent HH with 
Income 200k+ 
1.878 1.704  2.360  2.083  2.082  1.563 
[0.497] [0.503]  [0.495]  [0.485]  0.431  [0.484] 
χ2 358.65  402.13  408.89  399.62  409.40  411.18 
Pseudo R
2 0.52  0.51  0.51  0.52  0.51  0.53 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county 
population.  Robust standard errors in brackets.   61 
 
  
Table 3: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization: All Investors with Distance 
Interactions 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Jewish Organizations  0.019       
[0.005]        
Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations  
 1.026     
 [0.354]      
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org. 
   0.156     
   [0.066]     
Religious Organizations   1.39  x10
-5      
 [4.82x10
-5]      
Total Revenue of Religious Org. (100k)     1.49x10
-10    
   [1.12x10
-10]    
Kosher Restaurants      0.024  
    [0.007]   
JCC Organizations       0.062 
      [0.020] 
JCC Satellites       0.139 
     [0.063] 
Geographic distance from Madoff  -0.012 -0.011 -0.019  -0.018 -0.019 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Distance x Jewish Organizations  
-4.43x10
-6       
[-1.30x10
-
6] 
      
Distance  x Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations  
 -0.125     
  [0.174]      
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / Religious Rev.      -8.83  x10
-6    
   [5  x10
-5]    
Distance x Kosher Restaurants      0.004  
    [0.005]   
Distance x JCC Organizations       -0.005 
     [0.011] 
Ln(Median Income)  0.026 0.034 0.057  0.019 0.024 
[0.024] [0.025] [0.040]  [0.024] [0.024] 
Percent White  0.067 0.063 0.057  0.084 0.075 
[0.043] [0.045] [0.039]  [0.042] [0.044] 
Percent 65+  -0.072 -0.011 -0.033  -0.081 -0.052 
[0.125] [0.129] [0.132]  [0.131] [0.132] 
Percent of 65+ with college degree  2.088 1.651 2.300  2.278 2.330 
[0.417] [0.437] [0.439]  [0.423] [0.429] 
Percent HH with Income 200k+ 
1.763 1.651 2.360  2.014 2.089 
[0.468] [0.506] [0.494]  [0.464] [0.484] 
χ2 389.60  459.49  431.26  396.86  424.09 
Pseudo R
2 0.52  0.52  0.51  0.52  0.51 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county population.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.   62 
 
  
Table 4: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization: Non Profit Investors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Jewish Organizations 
3.64x10
-5        3.37x10
-5 
[2.77x10
-
5] 
      [0.0001] 
Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations  
 0.031       -0.013 
 [0.018]      [0.068] 
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ Total 
Rev. of Religious Org. 
   0.013      -0.004 
   [0.010]      [0.018] 
Religious Organizations 
 -1.21x10
-6       -8.29x10
-6 
 [1.84x10
-
6] 
     [4.56x10
-6] 
Total Revenue of Religious Org. 
(100k) 
  
-1.29x10
-
11 
   -6.08x10-
13 
   [1.54x10
-
11] 
   [1.91x10-
11] 
Kosher Restaurants     
2.32x10-
4 
 
2.67x10-4 
    [0.0001]    [2.04x10-
4] 
JCC Organizations      0.004  0.002 
     [0.002]  [0.003] 
JCC Satellites      -0.003  -0.0004 
    [0.002]  [0.003] 
Geographic distance from Madoff  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  -0.002 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.001] 
Ln(Median Income)  -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 
-0.002 -
0.0007 -0.004 
[0.002] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011]  [0.010] 
Percent White  0.021 0.018 0.015 0.022 0.021  0.023 
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019]  [0.018] 
Percent 65+  -0.028 -0.037 -0.037 -0.035 -0.029  -0.054 
[0.052] [0.055] [0.056] [0.050] [0.052]  [0.054] 
Percent of 65+ with college 
degree 
0.341 0.369 0.361 0.357 0.349  0.412 
[0.172] [0.182] [0.189] [0.163] [0.168]  [0.173] 
Percent HH with Income 200k+ 
0.195 0.199 0.217 0.160 0.150  0.124 
[0.121] [0.125] [0.123] [0.123] [0.120]  [0.130] 
 χ2 162.87  154.60  142.15  162.74  162.09  141.92 
Pseudo R
2 0.59  0.59  0.59  0.60  0.59  0.60 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county population.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.   63 
 
Table 5: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization:  Non Profit Investors with 
Distance Interactions 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Jewish Organizations  2.38x10
-5        
1.77x10
-5        
Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations  
 0.021      
 [0.018]      
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org. 
   0.011     
   [0.011]     
Religious Organizations   -2.49x10
-6      
 [4.30x10
-6]      
Total Revenue of Religious Org. (100k) 
   -1.28x10
-11    
   [1.54x10
-
11] 
  
Kosher Restaurants 
    2.07x10-4  
    [1.22x10-
4] 
 
JCC Organizations       0.003 
      [0.002] 
JCC Satellites       -0.001 
     [0.003] 
Geographic distance from Madoff  -0.005 -0.005 -0.003  -0.003 -0.004 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Distance x Jewish Organizations   1.42x10
-7       
[9.53x10
-8]        
Distance  x Jewish Organizations / 
Religious Organizations  
 0.104     
  [0.027]      
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / Religious Rev.      0.0005    
   [1.30x10
-5]    
Distance x Kosher Restaurants 
    0.0001  
   
[1.74x10-
4] 
 
Distance x JCC Organizations       0.001 
     [0.001] 
Ln(Median Income)  -0.006 -0.005 -0.005  -0.003 -0.001 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010]  [0.010] [0.011] 
Percent White  0.023 0.018 0.019  0.024 0.023 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017]  [0.019] [0.019] 
Percent 65+  -0.034 -0.038 -0.033  -0.035 -0.034 
[0.049] [0.051] [0.055]  [0.050] [0.052] 
Percent of 65+ with college degree  0.325 0.366 0.360  0.350 0.350 
[0.164] [0.180] [0.186]  [0.162] [0.168] 
Percent HH with Income 200k+ 
0.205 0.154 0.204  0.162 0.150 
[0.124] [0.124] [0.124]  [0.125] [0.119] 
χ2 172.16  136.61  149.47  166.44  164.13 
Pseudo R
2 0.59  0.59  0.60  0.59  0.59 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county population.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.    
 
Table 6: Mean Partial Elasticities from Negative Binomial Estimates of Madoff Victimization: All 
Investors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Jewish Organizations 
0.007 0.015 0.008 -.006 0.006 0.007 
[0.009] [0.020] [0.011] [0.009] [0.  101] [0.010] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.003 -0.198 -0.059 -0.083 -0.344 -0.171 
[0.088] [0.129] [0.116] [0.135] [0.158] [0.161] 
Distance x Jewish Organizations 
    0.008  0.010  0.008 
    [0.007]  [0.011]  [0.011] 
Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations 
12.7 25.4 15.4 3.23 8.71 4.35 
[6.20] [6.60] [6.73] [3.15] [5.11] [3.57] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.020 -0.187 -.034 -0.138 -0.343 -0.271 
[0.085] [0.118] [0.100] [0.087] [0.152] [0.128] 
Distance  x Jewish Organizations 
/ Religious Organizations 
    15.2  4.30  10.9 
    [7.08]  [4.93]  [5.15] 
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ Total 
Rev. of Religious Org 
4.77 4.98 5.08 3.19 2.61 3.19 
[1.41] [1.54] [1.58] [1.03] [0.84] [1.11] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.015 -0.198 -0.019 -0.076 -0.273 -0.133 
[0.069] [0.128] [0.087] [0.053] [0.148] [0.093] 
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / 
Religious Rev. 
    26.0  1.34  2.80 
    [13.7]  [1.63]  [1.52] 
Kosher Restaurants 
0.039 0.075 0.049 0.034 0.039 0.033 
[0.022] [0.041] [0.029] [0.017] [0.023] [0.018] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.019 -0.120 -0.028 -0.039 -0.280 -0.129 
[0.080] [0.125] [0.092] [0.098] [0.141] [0.096] 
Distance x Kosher Restaurants        0.014  0.014  0.014 
       [0.030]  [0.025]  [0.026] 
JCC Organizations 
0.239 0.227 0.207 0.366 0.404 0.253 
[0.129] [0.174] [0.139] [0.125] [0.208] [0.152] 
JCC Satellites 
0.167 0.148 0.202 0.511 0.522 0.592 
[0.406] [0.428] [0.412] [0.497] [0.669] [0.488] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.029 -0.171  -0.008 0.129 -0.129 0.138 
[0.085] [0.127] [0.099] [0.094] [0.125] [0.149] 
 
Distance  x JCC Organizations 
    -0.136  -0.194  -0.154 
    [0.057]  [0.067]  [0.060] 
        
N  308 3,139  3,139 308 3,139  3,139 
Additional controls include the log of county population, the percent of residents over 65 with a college 
degree, the percent of residents who are over 65, the log of median household income, the percent of 
household earning more than $200k in 2000, and the percent of residents who are white (non-Hispanic).  
Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 include the total number of religious organizations(2 and 4) and the total amount of 
revenue collected by those organizations (3 and 5), as well as the interaction of those measures with 
distance in columns 5 and 6.  Robust standard errors in brackets.  
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Table 7. Mean Partial Elasticities from Negative Binomial Estimates of Madoff Victimization: Non Profit 
Investors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Jewish Organizations 
-0.0004 3.05x10
-4 -0.0013  -0.0004 -2.4x10
-5 -0.0013 
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0006]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.430 -0.698 -0.749 -0.404 -0.669 -0.686 
[0.116] [0.189] [0.213] [0.117] [0.192] [0.196] 
Distance x Jewish 
Organizations 
    - 7 . 5 2   x10
-5 0.0002  0.001 
    [0.0003]  [0.0009]  [0.001] 
Jewish Organizations / 
Religious Organizations 
3.449 3.96 0.718  6.417  3.953  11.844 
[5.122] [3.112] [3.227] [3.660] [3.251] [6.321] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.305 -0.594 -0.334 -0.365 -1.000 -0.343 
[0.1285] [0.183]  [0.301]  [0.218] [0.272] [0.382] 
Distance  x Jewish 
Organizations / Religious 
Organizations 
    -4.01  -10.65  -5.16 
    [6.31]  [10.0]  [4.86] 
Total Rev. of Jewish 
Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org 
4.386 2.750 5.811 4.472 3.140 5.935 
[0.989] [1.475] [1.311] [1.107] [1.689] [1.437] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.1057 -0.584  -0.177 -0.0207 -0.468  -0.226 
[0.110] [0.168] [0.138] [0.122] [0.187] [0.244] 
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / 
Religious Rev. 
-0.0004 0.0003 0.0013 -0.0004  -2.4x10
-5 -0.0013 
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0006]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Kosher Restaurants 
0.010 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.013 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.304 -0.664 -0.514 -0.247 -0.621 -0.300 
[0.108] [0.201] [0.319] [0.116] [0.205] [0.168] 
Distance x Kosher 
Restaurants 
    -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
    [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
JCC Organizations 
0.234 0.015 0.197 0.222 -0.019 0.155 
[0.191] [0.260] [0.310] [0.221] [0.261] [0.342] 
JCC Satellites 
-0.178 -0.027 -0.246 0.408  0.697  0.031 
[0.198] [0.499] [0.255] [0.528]  [1.01]  [0.807] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.373 -0.693 -0.556 -0.142 -0.569 -0.182 
[0.116] [0.190] [0.207] [0.123] [0.204] [0.205] 
Distance  x JCC 
Organizations 
    -0.093  0.004  -0.018 
    [0.066]  [0.170]  [0.018] 
        
N  41 3,139  3,139 41 3,139  3,139 
Additional controls include the log of county population, the percent of residents over 65 with a college degree, 
the percent of household earning more than $200k in 2000, the log of median household income and the percent 
of residents who are white (non-Hispanic) and the percent of residents who are over 65.  Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 
include the total number of religious organizations (2 and 4) and the total amount of revenue collected by those 
organizations (3 and 5), as well as the interaction of those measures with distance in columns 5 and 6.  Robust 
standard errors in brackets.  
 
  66 
 
  
Table 8: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization: All Investors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Jewish Organizations  0.009         1.98x10
-4 
[0.003]        [0.003] 
Jewish Organizations 
/ Religious 
Organizations  
 0.882      0.633 
 [0.184]      [0.229] 
Total Rev. of Jewish 
Org. / 
 Total Rev. of Religious 
Org. 
   0.134    0.064 
   [0.041]     [0.041] 
Religious Organizations   -3.96x10
-5      -2.57x10
-5 
 [3.62  x10
-5]      [  3.93x10
-5] 
Total Revenue of  
Religious Org. (100k) 
   9.60x10
-12    2.23x10
-11 
   [1.24x10
-10]    [1.42x10
-10] 
Kosher Restaurants      0.025  0.019 
    [0.007]    [0.007] 
JCC Organizations      0.050  0.025 
     [0.016]  [0.017] 
JCC Satellites      -0.015  -0.038 
    [0.040]  [0.047] 
Geographic distance 
from Madoff 
-0.020 -0.018 -0.020 -0.016 -0.019 -0.014 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Ln(Median Income)  0.086 0.089 0.097 0.091 0.097  .084 
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] 
Percent White  0.106 0.086 0.113 0.114 0.117 0.099 
[0.050] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.053] [0.053] 
Percent 65+  -0.165 -0.052 -0.142 -0.169 -0.143 -0.118 
[0.133] [0.132] [0.136] [0.138] [0.138] [0.134] 
Percent of 65+ with  
college degree 
2.699 2.330 2.752 2.804 2.812 2.387 
[0.416] [0.413] [0.406] [0.402] [0.410] [0.407] 
Number of Doctors 
1.43x10
-5 3.37x10
-5 3.21x10
-5 1.55x10
-5 2.18x10
-5 1.41x10
-5 
[1.08x10
-5] [1.11x10
-5] [1.14x10
-5] [1.34x10
-5] [1.15x10
-5] [1.31x10
-5] 
χ2 357.36  384.37  393.99  404.15  409.40  408.53 
Pseudo R
2 0.51  0.52  0.51  0.52  0.51  0.53 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county population.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.   67 
 
 
 
  
Table 9: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization:  All Investors with 
Distance Interactions 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Jewish Organizations  0.019        
[0.005]        
Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations  
 0.807      
 [0.272]      
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org. 
   0.153    
   [0.066]    
Religious Organizations 
 4.03  x10
-5      
 [3.62x10
-
5] 
   
Total Revenue of Religious Org. (100k) 
   7.42x10
-12    
   [1.24x10
-
10] 
  
Kosher Restaurants      0.024  
    [0.007]   
JCC Organizations      0.058 
     [0.023] 
JCC Satellites      -0.018 
    [0.040] 
Geographic distance from Madoff  -0.011 -0.019 -0.020 -0.017 -0.019 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Distance x Jewish Organizations   -0.005       
[-0.001]        
Distance  x Jewish Organizations / 
Religious Organizations  
 -0.043     
  [0.139]      
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / Religious Rev.      -0.035    
   [0.060]    
Distance x Kosher Restaurants      0.003  
    [0.006]   
Distance x JCC Organizations      -0.007 
    [0.011] 
Ln(Median Income)  0.086 0.089 0.098 0.090 0.098 
[0.022] [0.051] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] 
Percent White  0.106 0.086 0.114 0.119 0.117 
[0.054] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.137] 
Percent 65+  -0.156 -0.047 -0.143 -0.176 -0.146 
[0.130] [0.133] [0.136] [0.139] [0.137] 
Percent of 65+ with college degree  2.550 2.335 2.744 2.826 2.822 
[0.391] [0.410] [0.405]  [0.408] [0.411] 
Number of Doctors 
1.65x10
-5 3.38x10
-5  3.26x10
-5  1.45x10
-5 2.22x10
-5 
[1.02x10
-
5] 
[1.11x10
-
5] [1.13x10
-5] 
[1.41x10
-
5] 
[1.12x10
-
5] 
χ2 185.84  151.28  196.08  186.84  190.23 
Pseudo R
2 0.60  0.63  0.61  0.60  0.60 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county population.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.   68 
 
  
Table 10: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization: Non Profit Investors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Jewish Organizations 
2.21x10
-5       5.15x10
-5 
[1.86x10
-
5] 
     [ 1 . 1 6 x10
-
4] 
Jewish Organizations 
/ Religious Organizations  
 0.041      -0.014 
 [0.020]      [0.060] 
Total Rev. of Jewish Org. / Total 
Rev. of Religious Org. 
   0.006     -0.009 
   [0.009]    [0.013] 
Religious Organizations 
  -8.65x10
-6      -1.76x10
-5 
 [ 4.04x10
-
6] 
    [ 5.35x10
-
6] 
Total Revenue of  
Religious Org. (100k) 
  
-4.00x10
-
11 
  
-1.09x10
-11 
   [ 3.51x10
-
11] 
   [2.11x10
-
11] 
Kosher Restaurants 
    1.82x10
-4  2.09x10
-4 
    [1.40x10
-
4] 
 [1.87x10
-
4] 
JCC Organizations      0.003  0.001 
     [0.002]  [0.003] 
JCC Satellites      -0.004  -0.002 
    [0.003]  [0.003] 
Geographic distance 
from Madoff 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Ln(Median Income)  -0.010 -0.003 -0.009  0.009 0.010 -0.002 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.003] 
Percent White  0.018 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.017 
[0.019] [0.017] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] 
Percent 65+  -0.030 -0.052 -0.040 -0.037 -0.029 -0.054 
[0.051] [0.052] [0.052] [0.050] [0.052] [0.052] 
Percent of 65+ with  
college degree 
0.396 0.443 0.417 0.037 0.386 0.441 
[0.158] [0.167] [0.163] [0.050] [0.156] [0.159] 
Number of Doctors 
1.86x10
-6 2.88x10
-6 2.44x10
-6  1.50x10
-6 1.75x10
-6 3.58x10
-6 
[9.33x10
-
7] 
[8.63x10
-
7] 
[8.44x10
-
7] 
[1.10x10
-
6] 
[1.13x10
-
6] 
[1.07x10
-
6] 
χ2  189.48 170.66 186.74 184.06 187.61 160.39 
Pseudo R
2  0.61 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.61 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county population.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.   69 
 
 
 
Table 11: Mean Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates of Madoff Victimization:  Non Profit Investors with 
Distance Interactions 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Jewish Organizations  2.03x10
-5        
1.53x10
-5        
Jewish Organizations / Religious 
Organizations  
 0.030      
 [0.019]      
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org. 
   0.007    
   [0.011]    
Religious Organizations 
 
-7.47x10
-6      
 [4.32x10
-
6] 
   
Total Revenue of Religious Org. (100k) 
   -4.04x10
-11    
   [3.54x10
-
11] 
  
Kosher Restaurants 
    1.80x10
-4  
    [1.39x10
-
4] 
 
JCC Organizations      0.003 
     [0.002] 
JCC Satellites      -0.004 
    [0.002] 
Geographic distance from Madoff  -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Distance x Jewish Organizations  
6.99x10
-5       
[1.19x10
-
5] 
    
Distance  x Jewish Organizations / 
Religious Organizations  
 0.087     
  [0.027]      
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / Religious Rev.      -0.002    
   [0.013]    
Distance x Kosher Restaurants 
    2.67x10
-5  
   
[2.00x10
-
4] 
 
Distance x JCC Organizations      -6.29x10
-4 
    [0.001] 
Ln(Median Income)  -0.009 -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
Percent White  0.019 0.015 0.016 0.020 0.018 
[0.019] [0.017] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] 
Percent 65+  -0.035 -0.050 -0.040 -0.037 -0.028 
[0.050] [0.050] [0.052] [0.049] [0.051] 
Percent of 65+ with college degree  0.399 0.422 0.417 0.407 0.388 
[0.156] [0.161] [0.162]  [0.154] [0.156] 
Number of Doctors 
1.53x10
-6 2.42x10
-6 2.45x10
-6  1.46x10
-6 1.84x10
-6 
[1.09x10
-
6] 
[8.89x10
-
7]  [8.45x10
-7]  [1.18x10
-
6] 
[1.14x10
-
6] 
χ2 184.88  156.24  192.95  184.30  189.99 
Pseudo R
2 0.59  0.61  0.60  0.60  0.60 
All models include 3,139 observations, and include a control for the natural log of county population.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.    
 
Table 12: Mean Partial Elasticities from Negative Binomial Estimates of Madoff Victimization: All 
Investors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Jewish Organizations  0.003 0.006 -0.0004 -.0025 0.003 0.002 
[0.006] [0.012] [0.0005] [0.0052] [0.  006] [0.006] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.006 -0.164 -0.452  -0.057 -0.266 -0.177 
[0.088] [0.136]  [0.158]  [0.134] [0.147]  [0.186] 
Distance x Jewish 
Organizations 
     0.006  0.010  0.008 
     [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.012] 
Jewish Organizations / 
Religious Organizations 
12.5 24.1  14.7  1.96  7.23 3.33 
[6.00] [5.60]  [6.21]  [1.78]  [4.23] [2.47] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.037 -0.150  -.032  -0.085 -0.269 -0.233 
[0.076] [0.118]  [0.097]  [0.080] [0.146]  [0.111] 
Distance  x Jewish 
Organizations / Religious 
Organizations 
     12.0  6.33  8.23 
     [4.20]  [4.31]  [4.24] 
Total Rev. of Jewish Org./ 
Total Rev. of Religious Org 
4.25 3.69  5.38  2.85  2.10 2.80 
[1.55] [1.04]  [1.19]  [1.21] [0.685]  [1.23] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.017 -0.166 -0.278  -0.052 -0.205 -0.130 
[0.070] [0.133]  [0.229]  [0.054] [0.142]  [0.086] 
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / 
Religious Rev. 
     1.20 1.39  1.87 
     [3.10]  [1.46]  [1.48] 
Kosher Restaurants  0.040 0.070  0.005  0.035  0.045 0.039 
[0.024] [0.038]  [0.005]  [0.021] [0.027]  [0.023] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.029 -0.155 -0.403  -0.019 -0.217 -0.076 
[0.079] [0.127]  [0.168]  [0.098] [0.135]  [0.023] 
Distance x Kosher Restaurants       0.012  0.012  0.012 
     [0.031]  [0.025]  [0.023] 
JCC Organizations  0.241 0.342  0.041  0.378  0.599 0.343 
[0.160] [0.243]  [0.247]  [0.158] [0.261]  [0.180] 
JCC Satellites  -0.105 -0.535  -0.181  0.005  -0.643 -0.070 
[0.420] [0.312]  [0.258]  [0.452] [0.351]  [0.446] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
0.030 -0.148 -0.495  0.247  -0.078 0.287 
[0.081] [0.136]  [0.168]  [0.109] [0.127]  [0.145] 
 
Distance  x JCC Organizations 
     -0.522  -0.457  -0.509 
     [0.189]  [0.150]  [0.167] 
           
N  308 3,139 3,139  308  3,139  3,139 
Additional controls include the log of county population, the percent of residents over 65 with a college 
degree, the percent of residents who are over 65, the log of median household income, the number of 
doctors, and the percent of residents who are white (non-Hispanic).  Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 include the total 
number of religious organizations (2 and 4) and the total amount of revenue collected by those 
organizations (3 and 5), as well as the interaction of those measures with distance in columns 5 and 6.  
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
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Table 13. Mean Partial Elasticities from Negative Binomial Estimates of Madoff Victimization: Non Profit 
Investors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Jewish Organizations  -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.004 
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.361 -0.626 -0.436 -0.189 -0.517 -0.294 
[0.118] [0.184] [0.159] [0.123] [0.177] [0.227] 
Distance x Jewish 
Organizations 
    -0.001  -0.0009  -0.001 
    [0.0001]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
Jewish Organizations / 
Religious Organizations 
3.01 4.46 4.52 3.94 2.45 -3.30 
[2.12] [2.76] [2.45] [3.33] [2.99] [3.60] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.140 -0.476 -0.309 -0.160 -0.758 -0.189 
[0.108] [0.170] [0.484] [0.204] [0.239] [0.325] 
Distance  x Jewish 
Organizations / Religious 
Organizations 
    -1.22  -2.91  -1.68 
   
[4.55] [7.06] [10.6] 
Total Rev. of Jewish 
Org./ Total Rev. of 
Religious Org 
3.98 1.96 5.38  4.292  2.43 5.33 
[0.973]  [1.29] [1.18]  [1.  076]  [1.46] [1.51] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.107 -0.561 -0.278 -0.061 -0.409 -0.170 
[0.117] [0.174] [0.229] [0.141] [0.197] [0.501] 
Distance  x Jewish Rev. / 
Religious Rev. 
    -0.0005  0.0002  -0.003 
    [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.008] 
Kosher Restaurants  0.007 -0.0003 0.005  0.007 -0.0004 0.006 
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.186] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.281 -0.621 -0.403 -0.163 -0.531 -0.300 
[0.115] [0.187] [0.168] [0.112] [0.179] [0.168] 
Distance x Kosher       -0.003  -0.001  -0.006 
Restaurants      [0.001]  [0.006]  [0.004] 
JCC Organizations  0.158 0.005 0.041 0.147 -0.028 0.126 
[0.162] [0.236] [0.247] [0.135] [0.120] [0.209] 
JCC Satellites 
-0.174 -0.199 -0.181 0.341  0.310 -0.023 
[0.176] [0.460] [0.258] [0.346] [0.502] [0.450] 
Geographic distance from 
Madoff 
-0.327 -0.641 -0.495 -0.148 -0.407 0.118 
[0.126] [0.195] [0.167] [0.130] [0.184] [0.296] 
Distance  x JCC 
Organizations 
    -0.210  -0.084  -0.342 
    [0.070]  [0.140]  [0.004] 
        
N  41 3,139  3,139 41 3,139  3,139 
Additional controls include the log of county population, the percent of residents over 65 with a college degree, 
the number of doctors, and the log of median household income, the percent of residents who are white (non-
Hispanic) and the percent of residents who are over 65.  Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 include the total number of 
religious organizations (2 and 4) and the total amount of revenue collected by those organizations (3 and 5), as 
well as the interaction of those measures with distance in columns 5 and 6.  Robust standard errors in brackets.  
 
 
 